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Deliberating About Public Interest 
Ian O’Flynn1 
Newcastle University, UK 
 
Abstract: Although the idea of the public interest features prominently in many 
accounts of deliberative democracy, the relationship between deliberative democracy 
and the public interest is rarely spelt out with any degree of precision.  In this article, I 
identify and defend one particular way of framing this relationship.  I begin by 
arguing that people can deliberate about the public interest only if the public interest 
is in principle identifiable independently of their deliberations.  Of course, some 
pluralists claim that the public interest is an implausible idea, which casts doubt on 
the idea that there might be something for people to deliberate about.  Yet while, 
following Brian Barry, we can get around this problem by defining the public interest 
as an interest in which everyone shares qua member of the public, what still needs to 
be explained is why people should be prepared to privilege this particular capacity.  I 
argue that the account of political equality with which deliberative democracy is 
bound up offers a compelling explanation of this sort, even if it also gives rise to some 
difficult questions of feasibility.  I conclude by considering the charge that any 
political scheme that framed the relationship between deliberative democracy and the 
public interest in this way would be undesirable. 
 
Keywords: deliberative democracy; the public interest; Brian Barry; representative 
government. 
 
‘The public interest’ is both an old and a familiar topic.2  Yet it is not a topic on which 
much has been written by political philosophers in recent decades.  In one sense, it is 
not hard to understand why the idea of the public interest has dropped out of fashion 
as an object of philosophical concern.  Usually, ‘the public interest’ is taken to 
describe a good that is common to an entire society, rather than to some particular 
section of it.  But in a world in which people differ among themselves so greatly, one 
might naturally want to question whether people can share an interest so described.  
Yet while the public interest may be a highly problematic, even deeply dangerous, 
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idea, there remain good reasons for persisting with that idea, even in the face of all the 
difficulties that attach to it.   
 
Political theorists have long stressed the extent to which democracy requires us to 
take a broader view of public issues than simply focusing on our own special interests 
in them (e.g., Mill 1991 [1861], p. 428).  In particular, they have stressed the extent to 
which it requires each of us to develop a more mature sense of responsibility for our 
actions, including a greater willingness to reflect on and take into account the 
consequences of those actions for others.  Recent political experience certainly seems 
to bear these theorists out.  For example, our recent economic predicament is in no 
small measure the result of a failure to take a larger or more encompassing view of the 
lives of rich and poor alike.  Something similar might be said of our current 
environmental plight or of our contemporary multicultural predicament.  In short, 
since many of our political problems stem from the failure to appreciate the manifold 
ways in which our lives are intertwined, there is every reason for thinking that ‘the 
public interest’ should, at any rate in principle, be made more central to democratic 
life.
3
 
 
Of course, a democratic government may decide to pursue the public interest for 
prudential or pragmatic reasons—most obviously, to stave off challenges to its 
legitimacy or to avoid the danger of political instability.  But the public interest is 
fundamentally a moral idea, one that is principally concerned with the proper conduct 
of political life in general and the proper ways of making collectively binding political 
decisions in particular  (Diggs 1973, p. 284; cf. Douglass 1980, pp. 104-105).  A 
government whose decisions about important matters of law and public policy are 
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driven by a concern for the good of society as a whole is a government that respects 
our standing as political equals.  At the same time, ordinary people who give their 
support to such governments not only recognise what they owe to one another as 
fellow citizens, but also something of the larger goals and purposes to which their 
democracy ideally should be put. 
 
In this article, I therefore propose to take a fresh look at how ‘the public interest’ 
might be identified and pursued by viewing it through a deliberative democratic lens.  
In a nutshell, the basic claim that I wish to defend is that deliberative democracy is 
well placed to deliver the public interest.  Although deliberative democracy is an 
outlook composed of different strands, all deliberative democrats can agree that 
important decisions about matters of law and public policy should ideally be decided 
not by force of numbers but by the force of the better argument (Habermas 1984, p. 
25).  To this end, many deliberative democrats maintain that arguments should be 
couched in terms that are accessible to everybody and could in principle be accepted 
by anyone (e.g., Gutmann and Thompson 1996; but see Bohman and Richardson 
2009).  So, while the deliberators may disagree about the meaning of those terms or 
about what they imply for the choice of one law or policy over another, they must still 
pay attention to one another’s arguments and respond to them rationally.  Of course, 
the deliberators need not be indifferent to their own special interest in the decision; on 
the contrary, the fact that they have a special interest may be what motivates them to 
deliberate in the first place (Manin 1987, p. 353; Christiano 1997, p. 260).  Yet insofar 
as they are willing to reflect seriously on what others have to say, and hence to take a 
broader view in making political decisions than simply consulting their own interests, 
the results of their deliberations may have a good claim to be in the public interest.   
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That, at least, is the basic idea.  However, as we will see throughout this article, the 
relationship between deliberative democracy and the public interest is far more 
complex than one might think.  In the opening section, I tackle one potential source of 
confusion.  Some deliberative democrats argue that deliberation ought to focus on the 
public interest.  But since that commits us to the view that the public interest is 
independently identifiable, the public interest cannot be merely whatever deliberation 
delivers.  Of course, some pluralists claim that the public interest is an implausible 
idea, which then casts doubt on the idea that there might be something for people to 
deliberate about.  I take up this issue in the second section, where I follow Brian Barry 
in arguing that the public interest needs to be defined as an interest in which everyone 
in society shares in his or her capacity as a member of the public.  In the third section, 
I seek to extend Barry’s argument.  I start by defending the normative claim that 
people ought to approach important decisions of law and public policy in their 
capacity as members of the public, before discussing how, in practical terms, a well 
designed deliberative democracy might bring this about.  Finally, in the last section, I 
consider the charge that any political scheme that required people to focus on the 
public interest would be undesirable.  In response, I suggest a number of reasons why 
this charge does not, in fact, hold. 
 
Deliberative democracy and the public interest 
 
Many deliberative democrats characterise their position in terms of a contrast between 
a politics of pluralistic competition, in which it is assumed that people seek what is 
best for themselves, and a politics of the common good, in which it is assumed that 
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people seek what is best in the public interest.  Although ‘the public interest’ tends not 
to be explicitly defined, deliberate democrats typically equate the term ‘public’ with 
all the members of a society, or with its citizens, and the term ‘interest’ with 
something that is beneficial (be that something like the good of living in a clean 
atmosphere or the policies that might secure such a good).  Yet although the idea of 
the public interest features prominently in many discussions of deliberative 
democracy, the relationship between deliberative democracy and the public interest is 
sometimes cast in very different ways—and, it should be said, the differences between 
them are rarely marked with any great degree of precision. 
 
For example, Seyla Benhabib, in her treatment of the idea of the public interest, 
‘proceeds not only from a conflict of values but also from a conflict of interests in 
social life’ (Benhabib 1996, p. 73).  Yet while people may disagree about all manner 
of things, she maintains that agreement can nevertheless be sought at the level of 
democratic procedure (but see Cohen 1994, 1996; Mansbridge 1998, p.10).  So, while 
people may start from their own special interests, the hope is that those interests can 
be filtered and transformed through a well designed deliberative process so that the 
decisions that emerge will be in the public interest.  On this pluralist view, therefore, 
deliberative democracy is treated as definitive of the public interest—i.e., the public 
interest cannot be determined until deliberation concludes and a decision has been 
reached.   
 
The view that we will be concerned with in this article is of a rather different sort, 
however.  That view also starts from the assumption that democratic deliberation will 
normally begin from a conflict of interests.  To this extent, it takes pluralism 
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seriously.  But the aim remains that of getting people to privilege those goods they 
share in common, or the many ways in which their lives or intertwined, despite the 
many other things that divide them.  On this (much more weakly pluralist) view, the 
public interest is not merely whatever deliberation delivers; it is not reducible to the 
outcome of a well designed deliberative procedure.  Instead, the public interest is, at 
least in principle, identifiable independently our deliberations. 
 
We can begin to gain a better understanding of this latter view by considering Joshua 
Cohen’s claim that, when properly conducted, ‘democratic politics involves public 
deliberation focused on the common good’ (Cohen 1989, p. 19).  But Cohen also 
wants to claim that ‘the interests, aims, and ideals that comprise the common good are 
those that survive deliberation’ (Cohen 1989, p. 25).  Taken on its own, this second 
claim might be taken to suggest that, for Cohen just as for Benhabib, the deliberative 
process is definitive of the public interest.  Yet although Cohen does not explicitly 
link his two claims together, the logical implication is clear enough.  One cannot 
claim that the deliberative process is definitive of the public interest while at the same 
time claiming that deliberation should focus on the public interest.  Having 
deliberated, we may have a better insight into what the public interest really is; in this 
sense, one could say that the public interest is whatever deliberation delivers.  Yet 
while our appreciation of the public interest may change on hearing what others have 
to say, the fact remains that we can only deliberate about the public interest if the 
public interest is, at least in principle, identifiable independently of our deliberations.  
In other words, to say that deliberation should focus on the public interest is to 
suppose that people will already have some idea of what the public interest is.   
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Of course, someone might respond that people cannot know what the public interest is 
until they have revealed their preferences and deliberated about them.  Yet what that 
response implies for the claim that people can deliberative about the public interest 
only if the public interest is independently identifiable will depend on where one 
stands on the broader philosophical debate concerning the proper relationship between 
preferences and interests.  It is generally agreed that preferences involve wants.
4
  Yet 
some political philosophers also seek to identify preferences or wants with interests.  
Here the claim can be of two different sorts.  It can be the empirical claim that, 
although logically we can distinguish a person’s interests from his or her preferences, 
nevertheless each person is still the best judge of his or her own interests—so that, for 
practical purposes, we can equate preferences and interests (e.g., Mill 1991 [1861], 
pp. 245-246; Dahl 1989, pp. 102-103).  But it can also be a more conceptual or logical 
claim—a person’s interest consists in nothing other than the person’s preferences and 
the satisfaction of his or her preferences; any attempt to impute an interest to a person, 
that is other than the person’s preferences, must be bogus.5 
 
If preferences are identified with interests, the claim that people cannot know what the 
public interest is until they have revealed their preferences and deliberated about them 
will effectively amount to the view that the public interest is whatever the deliberators 
eventually say it is.  Here, the idea that people can deliberate about the public interest 
only if the public interest is independently identifiable has no place.  Yet, as has often 
been argued, preferences need not be identified with interests.  Indeed, Peter Jones 
argues that ‘the refusal to distinguish interests from preferences is grossly 
implausible’ (Jones 1998, p. 17).  For instance, we may all agree that there is a public 
interest in economic recovery, but even after deliberation we may still not have a clear 
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preference about the matter.  Or, having deliberated, we might have a clear preference 
for a particular economic policy, but that policy might still turn out not be in the 
public interest (see Barry 1964, p. 5; Barry 1990 [1965], p. 181).   
 
These commonplace examples suggest that interests are not necessarily reducible to 
preferences.  They also enable us to make sense of the idea that people cannot 
deliberate about the public interest unless the public interest is independently 
identifiable.  The point might be put like this.  It may be that we cannot know what 
the public interest is until people have revealed their preferences and deliberated 
about them; only once we know that can we move to the next stage and deliberate 
about the goods or policies that would best satisfy those preferences.  But that second 
stage is the stage at which we are deliberating about the public interest and what 
policies would best serve that interest.  It is not another round of preference 
expressions since, although deliberation may help us to better understand what we 
want or why it is reasonable to want it, we may still misjudge the public interest or the 
policies most likely to secure it.  
 
This means, of course, that the public interest may be controversial—with all the best 
will in the world, different people may arrive at different conclusions about what is 
best for the entire society.  Yet while there is no Platonic form of the public interest 
that experts can ‘know’ and use to judge the correctness of our decisions, the fact that 
the public interest may be controversial does not undermine view that people can 
deliberate about the public interest only if the public interest is independently 
identifiable.  That view does not deny that people may get it wrong (i.e., the laws or 
policies upon which we decide may turn out not to be good for some or all).  It merely 
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denies that the public interest is reducible to whatever the deliberators say it is.  There 
is a parallel here with John Rawls’s distinction between ‘imperfect procedural justice’ 
and ‘pure procedural justice’ (Rawls 1971, pp. 83-90).  In imperfect procedural 
justice, we know from the outset that there are independent criteria for the right 
outcome, and we design procedures to deliver than outcome. Yet at the same time we 
recognise that no procedure will be perfect in this regard.  In the case of pure 
procedural justice, however, an outcome is just if and because it is the outcome of a 
just procedure and there is no way of identifying a just outcome independently of the 
procedure.   
 
In sum, while some deliberative theorists think of the link between deliberative 
democracy and the public interest as if it were like the case of pure procedural justice, 
the account with which we are concerned in this article is more like the case of 
imperfect procedural justice.  Admittedly, this distinction does not settle anything.  
One can agree that people cannot deliberate about the public interest unless the public 
interest is, in principle, independently identifiable.  Yet it remains to shown that, in a 
modern pluralistic society, people can actually share a public interest.  I take up this 
issue in the next section, where I follow Brian Barry in defining a public interest not 
just as an interest in which everyone shares, but as an interest in which everyone 
shares qua member of the public.  In later sections, much of what I will have to say 
will concern the fact that the public interest can be controversial or that people can be 
wrong about it. 
 
The public interest and political disagreement 
 
 10 
So how might one characterise the public interest so that the deliberators actually 
have something to talk about?   In practice, democratic governments frequently appeal 
to the idea of the public interest in defending their decisions.  They usually do so as if 
the public interest were an objective phenomenon. Yet very often the thing that is said 
to be in the public interest is not, on the face of it, in the interest of some people.  For 
example, while the government may claim that a pleasant natural environment is in 
the public interest, the owners of a polluting factory may argue that environmental 
protection policies are not in their interest because their profits will fall.  Or while the 
government may claim that social cohesion is in the public interest, some ethnic 
groups may argue that policies that aim at greater levels of social integration are not 
in their interest because those policies make it harder for them to preserve their 
distinct way of life. 
 
Disagreements of this sort can attach to the adoption of almost any public policy, so 
much so that the idea of public interest can begin to look rather implausible.  Yet at 
the same time it would seem rather odd to say that a public interest in, for example, 
peace and security is defeated simply because society happens to contain an arms 
manufacturer who would do very well out of a civil war, especially if he or she could 
get out of the country in time.  Of course, we may think that public interests should 
sometimes yield to special interests.  But the mere existence of a strong private 
interest does not seem sufficient grounds for rejecting the idea of the public interest 
out of hand (Goodin 1996, p. 338).  Nor does the mere fact of disagreement suffice to 
show that the idea of the public interest is implausible.  For example, everyone may 
want secure external defence, but some may think that holding nuclear weapons 
promotes that goal, while others believe that holding those weapons imperils it.  Here 
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the two parties do not have conflicting interests; they simply disagree about the best 
strategy for promoting something that is in their common interest.  And yet the 
trouble is that the disagreements with which we began this section (the owners of a 
polluting factory concerned about profits or the members of an ethnic group 
concerned about the preservation of their distinct way of life) are not of this sort: they 
are not about the most effective means to fairly obvious common goals but instead 
involve genuine conflicts of interest.  A different line of argument is therefore 
required in order to show that something can be in the public interest while still 
arousing opposition from some.  
 
As Brian Barry points out, instead of simply saying that a policy is in our interest, we 
will often specify some role or capacity in which it is of benefit to us: as a parent, as 
an employer, as a house owner and so on (Barry 1964, p. 14).  Sometimes, however, a 
policy that is in our interest in one role will not be in our interest in some other role—
for example, as a pedestrian, lowering the speed limit is in my interest, but as a 
motorist, I have reason to oppose the policy.  What Barry asks us to see is that 
disagreements about the public interest can be explained in just the same way.  One of 
the roles in which everyone sometimes finds himself or herself is that of ‘a member of 
the public’.  In that capacity, we will naturally tend to favour goods or policies that 
are in the interest of everyone in society, rather than goods or policies that benefit us 
in some more particular role (Barry 1964, pp. 14-15; see also Douglass 1980, p. 111).
6
  
Thus, qua member of the public, I share an interest with everyone else in society in 
living in a clean atmosphere.  But qua owner of a polluting factory, I share a special 
interest with my fellow factory 
7
owners in opposing costly proposals to cut harmful 
emissions.  Etc. 
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By drawing our attention to the different roles or capacities in which we sometimes 
find ourselves, Barry shows that the idea of the public interest does not have to 
exclude the possibility that some people whom a public interest encompasses may 
have other interests that conflict with that public interest.  We do not need to articulate 
a sophisticated ontology to understand what is at issue here.  The feeling of being role 
conflicted in the way Barry describes is a fairly commonplace experience.  But even 
so, his defence of the idea of the public interest takes us only so far.  Analytically, 
Barry demonstrates that ‘the public interest’ is not an implausible notion—a public 
interest is an interest that that attaches to a role or capacity in which each of us shares 
qua member of the public, and hence in principle can be identified independently of 
our deliberations.  Normatively, however, his argument stops at precisely the point at 
which matters become really interesting,  In particular, it does not explain why the 
public interest in a decision should be prioritised or why democratic institutions 
should be designed in ways that encourage people to take the broader view. 
 
Some issues, Barry argues, will allow a policy to be produced that will affect 
everyone only in his or her capacity as a member of the public.  (Although Barry does 
not provide an example, a change to the age at which someone is entitled to vote 
might be the sort of thing that is at issue here.)  Yet as he also argues, other issues will 
lack this simplicity, because some of us will be affected in some other capacity as 
well.  This may not present much of a problem as long as our net interest continues to 
be affected in a positive direction.  But it may well become a serious problem if the 
overall balance of our interest starts to tip the other way (Barry 1964, p. 15).  In such 
cases, Barry simply concludes that ‘the public interest has to be balanced against the 
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special interests involved and cannot therefore be followed exclusively’ (Barry 1964, 
p. 16).
 8
  Yet insofar as democracy really does require us to broaden our perceptions 
and expand our sympathies, then it is clear that things should not be left at that.   
 
Barry is right, of course, to say that a balance may sometimes need to be struck.  But 
what he does not tell us is how, normatively speaking, that balance ought to be struck 
or what weight we ought to give to things.  In our world today, people often seem to 
give more weight to their own special interests than to the public interest; special 
interests weigh more heavily in the balance for them.  But, as I suggested earlier, there 
are good reasons to seek to tip the balance back the other way, toward the public 
interest.  In what follows, I argue that deliberative democracy justifies and brings 
further clarity to the view that people should be more willing to approach important 
decisions of law or policy in their capacity as members of the public. But as we will 
also see, the connection between deliberative democracy and the public interest is far 
more complex, both in theory and in practice, than one might initially think. 
 
Deliberative democracy and the pursuit of the public interest 
 
Up to this point, I have argued that, logically, people can deliberate about the public 
interest only if the public interest is identifiable independently of their deliberations.  
Following Barry, I have also argued that one of the ways in which we might think 
about the public interest as being something that is independently identifiable is by 
seeing it as attaching to a particular social role.  But none of this shows that 
deliberative democracy is well placed to deliver the public interest.  We can begin to 
make that case by seeing how the particular account of political equality with which 
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deliberative democracy is bound up obliges us to approach important matters of law 
or policy in our capacity as a member of the public rather than from some other, less 
encompassing or partial perspective.   
 
In any free society, people will tend to arrive at different conclusions about such 
things as the place of religion in their lives, the value of material possessions or the 
importance of tradition or culture to living a worthwhile life (Rawls 1996, pp. 54-58; 
Cohen 1996, p. 101).  This variation in human outlook is perfectly natural, as is the 
more general societal pluralism that results.  But, for deliberative democrats, it carries 
with it particular normative implications for how we should relate to one another as 
fellow members of society.  On a deliberative understanding, recognising others as 
equals in political argument means recognising that those others can have reasons to 
hold their views as firmly as we hold ours.  Hence, if we do not listen respectfully to 
what they have to say, try to see things from their perspective, or couch our own 
argument in terms that they could accept, we fail to respect their standing as political 
equals. 
 
Deliberative democracy therefore obliges us to take a broader or more encompassing 
view of important decisions of law or policy than merely consulting our own special 
interest in them.  In other words, it requires us to approach matters of common 
political concern in our capacity as a member of the public, rather than in some more 
particular capacity (Mill 1991 [1861], p. 255).  In our capacity as a member of the 
public, we will naturally tend to pursue those things that are good for everybody in 
society, rather than those that are only good for some.  Of course, it may sometimes 
be very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to make this shift in role perspective.  
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Much will depend on the particular policy issue.  But the particular account of 
political equality with which deliberative democracy is bound up offers a ground for 
arguing that we ought to at least try to make this shift—and to try to do so as often as 
possible, even when our net interest seems to point the other way.  
 
So described, deliberative democracy seems well placed to deliver ‘the public 
interest’, albeit somewhat indirectly.  For Benhabib and others who think that 
deliberative democracy is definitive of the public interest, the hope is that deliberation 
will transform special interests into public interests.  But on the view under 
consideration here, the hope is that deliberation will lead people to shift from one role 
into another—as such, the emphasis in the first instance is not on preference 
transformation but on role transformation.  In asking people to make this shift, the aim 
is not to belittle special interests, as if those special interests were inherently suspect, 
but to give greater weight to those interests that we hold in common with everyone 
else qua members of the public.  In other words, the aim is to remind us of the many 
ways in which our preferences stand to affect others in society and of what the proper, 
moral response should be to the many ways in which our lives are intertwined. 
 
Again, however, the trouble is that matters may not turn as planned.  Take an 
everyday bargain—you give me something that I want, and I will give you something 
that you want in return.  An agreement of this sort might serve each of our special 
interests but it would not serve the public interest in Barry’s sense.  In other words, 
we may have a shared interest in a decision, but that interest need not be an interest 
that we have qua members of the public.  In response, one could insist that, whereas 
we can agree to a bargain for different reasons, an agreement reached through 
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deliberation ‘must rest on identical reasons that are able to convince parties in the 
same way’ (Habermas 1996, p. 166).  Yet one still cannot say that an agreement 
reached on that basis is necessarily in the public interest.  Suppose that each and every 
one of us enjoys eating greasy food once a week; but suppose that diet leads to 
increased health-care costs to the national health service which we all bear qua 
members of the taxpaying public.  So, we have a special interest in eating greasy food 
once a week, but a public interest (qua members of the taxpaying public) in our not 
doing so.  Suppose we like eating greasy food more than we dislike paying the (small) 
extra amount of taxes that that entails; so the upshot of our deliberations on the topic 
leads to our agreeing to let each other eat greasy food once a week.  We have 
deliberation in that decision.  And the decision was driven by the same reason for 
everyone.  But that reason spoke to our special interest, not the public interest. 
 
We can never be sure that people will deliberate wisely or that they will seek anything 
more than the satisfaction of their own special interests in cases where a public 
interest could also have been pursued.  But there are still things that we can do, 
practically speaking, to increase the chances not just that the better argument will win 
the day, but that people will approach important matters of law and policy in their 
capacity as members of the public.  That is, there are still things that we can do to try 
to ensure not just that people agree for the same reasons, but that those reasons 
support the public interest in a decision (cf. Goodin 1996, pp. 339-341; Pettit 2004, 
pp. 165-169).  By way of illustration, consider parliamentary debates within 
representative institutions. 
 
 17 
Many deliberative democrats argue that representative institutions should be as open 
or transparent as possible.  The driving assumption here is that, in an open policy 
debate, it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be chosen 
merely because it is good for oneself, since to do so would excite ridicule or contempt 
(Goodin 1992, pp. 124, 132).  Rather, having to argue in public forces representatives 
to defend their policy proposals from the broader perspective of a member of the 
public, whether they like it or not (see Elster 1998, pp. 109-111).  Unfortunately, the 
empirical evidence does not seem to support this assumption.  As Jürg Steiner and his 
colleagues show, in open parliamentary debates, especially when the issue is 
contentious, representatives will usually offer coherent arguments, but they rarely 
show any willingness to reflect seriously on the arguments put to them by others 
(Steiner et al. 2004).  At least on this evidence, parliaments seem extremely 
vulnerable to partisan behaviour.  Of course, partisanship may genuinely be 
partisanship over what the public interest is.  So the objection to partisanship need not 
be that it is ‘special’ rather than ‘public’ in perspective.  Yet either way, the fact 
remains that, although parliaments may be open to public view, they seem not to be 
particularly conducive to good quality debate designed to reach the best possible 
understanding of the public interest.   
 
In short, it is not enough to say that parliaments should be open or transparent.  If we 
wish to increase the pressure on representatives to take the broader view, parliaments 
must be open or transparent in the right way.  Since parliamentary behaviour is often 
driven by a concern for re-election, electoral reform is one obvious possibility.  There 
are numerous options here (see James 2004; O’Flynn 2010).  But since our concern is 
with promoting thinking in terms of the public interest, the obvious assumption is that 
 18 
candidates and parties should be accountable to the entire society at election time—
and unambiguously so.  For example, Andrew Rehfeld has recently argued that the 
best way to focus minds on the public interest during the course of an election is to 
have voters randomly assigned to constituencies (as opposed to the more familiar 
territorial approach whereby voters are assigned to constituencies on the basis of 
where they happen to live).  Since each voter has an equal chance of being assigned to 
any one constituency, each constituency will end up looking (largely) like the entire 
society, albeit in microcosm.  Moreover, since, on Rehfeld’s scheme, voters are to be 
assigned on a permanent basis, they cannot simply move to a constituency that they 
find more congenial or where they might find it easier to protect their own special 
interests.   
 
Rehfeld expressly intends his scheme ‘to be a contemporary way to institutionalise 
James Madison’s thoughts on defeating factionalism’ (Rehfeld 2005, p. 212).  But he 
also expressly notes that there are problems with it.  If, for example, a society 
contained a stable majority and a stable minority, the majority might not have any 
particular incentive to care about the views of the minority; insofar as the party 
system reflected that same cleavage, it is not clear why the parties of the majority 
would be willing to pursue the public interest once returned to power.  In the face of 
this sort of difficulty, it is curious that Rehfeld should persist in arguing that majority 
rule is the natural ‘default position’.  Rehfeld claims that the problem here lies not 
with majority rule but with an underlying failure of social justice (Rehfeld 2005, pp. 
205, 231-232).
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  Yet while majority rule may not be the root cause of the problem, it 
certainly compounds the problem.   
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Arguably, proportional representation (PR) systems are much more in tune with the 
idea of assigning voters randomly to constituencies that majority rule.  As the term 
suggests, PR systems tend to reduce disproportional vote-to-seat ratios.  But they also 
tend to multiply political parties which can turn an election into a highly uncertain or 
competitive affair—even large parties may need to care about how they are perceived 
generally, perhaps forcing them to look beyond their own core supporters for at least 
some votes (Taagepera Shugart 1989).  Crucially, in order to win those votes, they 
might have to appeal to interests shared by the entire electorate qua members of the 
public—that is, they might have to couch their arguments in terms of the public 
interest.  Of course, things might always play out that way in practice.  
Representatives might not be able to justify a policy simply by pointing to how it 
serves the special interests of some particular individual or group, but it need not 
follow that representatives need always appeal to the public interest: in some cases, 
they might be able to justify their proposals by appealing to a range of different 
special interests.  However, a combination of randomly assigned constituencies and 
PR might significantly reduce the scope for this sort of behaviour.  Under PR systems, 
every vote counts, at least in the sense that every vote adds to a party’s or a 
candidate’s overall percentage share of the vote.  So, while candidates or parties 
might in theory be able to appeal to every special interest in the entire society, in 
practice they might find it a great deal easier to appeal to the public interest. 
 
The question of desirability 
 
Even allowing that that questions of institutional feasibility can be overcome, the 
normative question still remains as to whether any of this is actually desirable.  In 
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obliging us to approach important questions of law and policy in our capacity as a 
member of the public, deliberative democracy seems to require us to sacrifice our own 
special interests for the sake of the greater good, whenever the two conflict.  And in 
requiring us to privilege those goods which we share in common qua members of the 
public over goods that we might favour in some other, more particular capacity, it 
seems to curtail individual freedom or autonomy.  However, while deliberative 
democracy is strongly perfectionist, it does not suppose that the public interest must, 
or indeed can, always win the day. 
 
As we have seen, the particular account of political equality with which deliberative 
democracy is bound up obliges us to pay attention to those things that we share in 
common qua members of the public.  Yet in some cases, the better arguments may 
turn out to be on the side of the special interest: the public interest might be ‘thin’ 
whereas the particular interest might be ‘thick’.  Suppose that (for ‘geopolitical’ 
reasons) we think that national service is in the public interest because it secures 
external defence.  However, our deliberations might lead us to the conclusion that 
exemptions should be made for the conscientious objector whose special interest in 
living as a pacifist conflicts with national service.  External defence remains in the 
public interest.  But on the ground that failing to provide exemptions would place an 
intolerable burden on some people, our deliberations might nevertheless lead us to 
support the special interest at least in some cases.  As such, one might say that 
deliberative democracy is well placed not just to deliver the public interest, but also to 
identify those exceptional cases where a special interest justifiably overrides a public 
interest.   
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Perhaps more obviously still, deliberative democracy does not suppose (à la 
Rousseau) that there is, or must be, a public interest in every decision.  In some cases, 
people will simply have conflicting interests.  Disputes between private individuals or 
factions are often of this sort.  But so, too, are many of the larger controversies or 
divisions in a society—for example, the ongoing dispute in Britain about whether 
hunting with dogs should or should not be banned.  In such cases, there is no clear 
public interest, or no good that is common to the entire society, at stake in the 
decision.  Yet even here deliberative democracy continues to ask us to take the 
broader view.  One usual way of resolving conflicts of interest is to bargain.  Yet as 
Jürgen  Habermas argues, this does not authorise us to take advantage of those whom 
life has dealt a weaker hand.  Rather, bargaining should follow procedures that treat 
everyone fairly and that aim at compromises that leave everyone better off than before 
(Habermas 1996, pp. 165-166).  In other words, once located within the theory of 
deliberative democracy, bargaining should follow procedures that are themselves 
mutually justifiable or based on common ground.  It should, moreover, do so for the 
reason that this is what the political equality of democracy demands. 
 
As such, I agree with Jane Mansbridge that bargaining can, and indeed should, be 
regarded as a legitimate component of deliberative democracy (Mansbridge 2006; 
Mansbridge et al. 2010).  I also agree with her that, under free and fair conditions, 
bargaining can help secure many of the goods that deliberative democrats typically 
prize—it can help clarify disagreement, increase levels of mutual understanding and 
respect and increase levels of solidarity.  But when it comes to the pinch, the vital 
issue is not whether there should be more bargaining in deliberative theory, but 
whether there should be less bargaining in the real world.  As I have argued, in cases 
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where there is both a public interest and a special interest in a decision, the account of 
political equality with which deliberative democracy is bound up implies that 
everyone should be prepared to take the broader view; that is to say, we should be 
prepared to approach important matters of law or policy in our capacity as members 
of the public rather than from some other, partial perspective.  Again, as I mentioned 
earlier, this is not to deny that deliberation will often proceed from expressions of 
special interest; and as I also noted, the public interest may itself be controversial.  
But in a world in which scant attention is paid to the many ways in which our lives are 
intertwined, we should try to make every effort to tilt our deliberations more in the 
direction of the public interest and away from the special interest when both are 
present within a decision.  There can be no guarantees of success.  Yet there are still 
good moral reasons why, in Rawlsian terms, we should try to be a bit more 
‘reasonable’ and a bit less ‘rational’, and strive to design our democratic institutions 
to that end.
10
 
 
There is, however, one further worry that needs to be addressed.  On the face of it, 
one basic difficulty with what I have said so far is that it assumes that public interests 
can be clearly distinguished from special interests.  Yet if we have learned anything 
from the vast literature on the distinction between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’, we 
have learned that what can appear to be in the interest of ‘the public’ often turns out to 
be merely in the interest of its dominant members.  Feminists have long been alive to 
worries of this sort (e.g., Pateman 1970; Young 1990).  Of course, to say that the 
boundaries of the public and the private may be unjustly drawn is not the same as 
saying that the distinction should be abandoned.   Some things are rightly private 
matters, just as other things are rightly matters of public concern.  Still, the boundaries 
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between the public and the political should always be open to criticism, in principle 
from any quarter.  Thus, in this vein, Iris Young maintained that ‘a democratic public 
sphere should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of 
the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are 
oppressed or disadvantaged’ (Young 1990, p. 165). 
 
Now, I have argued that deliberation can focus on the public interest only if the public 
interest is, at least in principle, identifiable independently of our deliberations.  But I 
have also argued that this commits us to a particular view of the relationship between 
deliberative democracy and the public interest, one which is more like a case of 
imperfect procedural justice than like a case of pure procedural justice.  Hence, one 
can consistently claim both that the public interest is in principle identifiable 
independently of our deliberations and that we, the deliberators, may get it wrong.  In 
our capacity as members of the public, we may misjudge our (public) interest or the 
laws or policies intended to secure that interest (much as a jury might convict the 
innocent or free the guilty).  Yet by the same token, deliberative democracy might just 
as easily help us to revise our list of public interests in ways that correct for old 
mistakes or historical injustices.  Having listened to and reflected on the arguments 
made on all sides, we may come to realise that some of the things we thought were in 
the public interest benefit merely some, just as we may come to realise that some of 
the things that seemed to benefit merely some are good for the entire society.  There 
can be no guarantees of success here—just as we saw in the last section, a great deal 
will turn on our ability to institute deliberative democracy so that the broadest 
possible range of views and opinions are genuinely taken into account and weighed in 
the balance.  But, theoretically at least, the point remains that there is nothing about 
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the view that we have been exploring in this article that precludes the possibility of 
revising our understanding of the public interest or, by extension, our understanding 
of where the boundary between the public and the private ought, for now, to lie.   
 
Thus, it seems that many of the worries that might lead one to question the desirability 
of the relationship between deliberative democracy and the public interest as I have 
described it in this article do not (or at least need not) hold.  Indeed, deliberative 
democracy can itself be thought of as a public interest, albeit of a second order kind.  
As members of the public, we have a common interest in ensuring that bargains are 
conducted under mutually justifiable conditions, just as we have a common interest in 
knowing that decisions about important matters of law and policy can be revisited and 
revised.  But as members of the public we also have a common interest in ensuring 
that minority voices are included.  Unless those voices or included—unless the public 
interest is itself treated as a site of contestation (Mansbridge 1998)—our 
understanding of what it means to be a member of the public may stagnate, just as our 
understanding of what is or is not in the public interest may become a source of 
unjustified oppression.  Neither stagnation nor injustice would serve us well as a 
democratic society. 
 
In conclusion 
 
It is true that the idea of the public interest itself does not specify how particular 
public interests might be best interpreted or secured.  Nor does the idea provide any 
help when the pursuit of one public interest conflicts with the pursuit of another.  
Democratic governments will only ever have limited resources at their disposal, 
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which inevitably means that conflicts of this sort will ‘require tricky judgements about 
priorities and trade-offs, which the goals themselves don’t reveal’ (Dahl 1989, p,. 
285).  Yet the fact that that the pursuit of one public interest may in practice conflict 
with the pursuit of another does little to undermine the idea of the public interest per 
se.  After all, the values of freedom and equality can also conflict.  But no one 
seriously suggests that we should give up on those values simply because of the many 
tensions that can arise between them.  So, while it is true that goals like a clean 
environment or an efficient transport network will not determine collective decisions, 
at least they provide a basis for collective decisions.   
 
What ultimately matters is not that ‘tricky judgements’ will have to be made—that 
much is both obvious and largely unavoidable—but how they are made.  The choice 
seems clear enough, at any rate in principle.  Either we can approach political 
decisions as they might be approached by someone in his or her role as a member of 
the public, or we can approach them in some other role.  As I have argued in this 
article, the particular account of political equality which deliberative democracy is 
bound up says that we should try to privilege the first of these two roles.  In other 
words, it says that we should try to take a broader or more encompassing view of 
public issues than simply consulting our own special interests in them.  Of course, 
there are no ‘quick fixes’ here.  But things can be done to change the character of 
democratic politics—by way of illustration, I pointed to the possibilities of electoral 
reform for improving the quality of debate within representative institutions.  Insofar 
as suggestions of this sort can be implemented, there is reason to think that 
deliberative democracy is well placed to deliver the public interest, not just in theory 
but in practice as well. 
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1
 Earlier drafts of this article were presented at conferences in Southampton and 
Glasgow.  I learned a great deal from audience members on each occasion.  For 
insightful written comments, I am indebted to Peter Jones, Stephen Elstub, David 
Russell, the editors of this journal and anonymous reviewers.   
2
 For the purposes of this article, I take it that ‘the public interest’ is the same as ‘the 
common good’, ‘the public good’, ‘the general interest’, ‘the national interest’ etc.  
For of a discussion of the various distinctions that might be drawn between these 
concepts, see Douglass 1980; Barry 1990 [1965].  As I suggest in the main body of 
the text, as they are typically defined, the basic feature of these concepts is their 
describing a good that is common to an entire society.  For a discussion of alternatives 
to this ‘common to all’ approach to the definition of ‘the public interest’, see Held 
1970. 
3
 One might naturally wonder about the status of the claim that ‘our lives are 
intertwined’.  The thought here appeals to a familiar ‘golden rule’: insofar as our 
decisions have implications for others, we should be careful not to treat them in ways 
that we ourselves would not like to be treated.  Of course, this injunction can itself be 
understood in moral or prudential terms, which will colour how we understand the 
idea of the public interest (see Douglass 1980).  The argument of this article is 
primarily moral, as should be clear from the main body of the text. 
4
 Deliberative democrats argue that preferences or wants should not be taken simply 
as given, but should instead be shaped through discussion and debate.  Still, 
deliberative democrats typically define preferences as wants, even if they think that 
the only wants that are relevant to democratic decision-making are those that can be 
justified in open political debate (e.g., Sunstein 1993). 
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5
 Brian Barry imputes this later view to John Miller (Barry 1964, p. 2; ref. to Miller 
1962, p. 40).  Although Barry does not elaborate, this view seems to have been fueled 
by the nefarious ideological purposes for which the notion of ‘real interests’ has been 
used.  In particular, liberals (or economics of a liberal bent) are generally wary of 
separating interests and preferences too much, since that separations seem to ‘imply a 
decision-maker who stands outside and apart from the people whose interests he is 
assessing’ (Jones 1998, p. 18; for a general discussion, see Douglass 1980). 
6
 Even here, of course, there may be scope for disagreement: people may reasonably 
disagree in their over-arching role as members of the public about what is in the 
public interest.  But the point remains that different interests attach to different roles, 
even if that in itself does not settle all disagreements (see Goodin1996, p. 339). 
7
  As Robert Gooding puts it, ‘How extensive such shared concerns may be varies 
from place to place and waxes and wanes with time’ (Goodin1996, p. 339). 
8
 Virginia Held argues that Barry’s ‘approach appears to have serious difficulties, as it 
assigns no role in evaluations of the public interest to anyone’s net interest, which 
would seem to be what any individual asserting his interests in a set of activities 
would actually and justifiably ground them upon’ (Held 1970, p. 118).  This criticism 
is unjustified, since Barry clearly says that where our special interest outweighs our 
share of the public interest, the public interest may have to give way.  What Barry 
fails to explain, however, is whether balancing acts of this sort need to be based on 
pragmatic considerations only, or whether normative considerations also come into 
play (and, if so, which ones).  
9
 Rehfeld offers a second defence of majority rule, based on the median voter thesis, 
which essentially says that in a two party system with many floating voters, 
candidates and parties will seek to please as many people as possible by moving to the 
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middle of the political spectrum (Rehfeld 2005, pp. 226-227).  Those conditions 
might obtain in the case on which Rehfeld focuses—the United States—but there are 
also many cases where they do not obtain.  Even where they do hold, catering to the 
middle of the political spectrum might leave many minority interests unrepresented 
(i.e., parties might move closer together, but some sections of society might remain 
just as far apart as ever). 
10
 In concluding their defence of the place of self-interest within deliberative 
democracy, Mansbridge and her co-authors ask: ‘Will legitimating self-interest, even 
in constrained from, undermine the capacity of the democratic deliberative ideal to 
inspire transformations in the direction of the common good?  In practice, perhaps 
yes’ (Mansbridge et al. 2010, p. 78).  Ultimately, it seems that Mansbridge is more 
concerned with taking pluralism seriously than with advancing the public interest in a 
decision. 
